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1 Introduction
It has become a characteristic of modern economies that individuals work for many different em-
ployers during their life. Topel and Ward (1992) report that an average white male in the USA holds
seven different full-time jobs during the first ten years of his career alone. Moreover, each month
about 2. 6 percent of all employed in the US switch to a new employer (Fallick and Fleischman 2004).
In such labor markets characterized by high turnover, firms’ hiring and remuneration decisions de-
pend to a large extent on the employment history and track record of an individual. Good current
performance enhances the labor market’s perception of a worker’s ability and increases his future
earnings, providing a strong motivation for effort. As a consequence, the explicit incentive contract
has two distinct functions. First, it is supposed to directly affect effort incentives through monetary
transfers. Second, it is supposed to indirectly affect effort by controlling the flow of information to
the market to create appropriate reputational incentives.
The current employer has at her disposal a variety of information about her workers that she can
use as inputs in her reward scheme and that is not otherwise available to the labor market. For
example, the firm can link compensation to the individual’s own performance by implementing
piece rates or make compensation contingent on measures of relative performance by creating a
rank-order tournament or implementing a group bonus scheme. The labor market tries to back
out such information by “inverting” the compensation formula. Therefeore, the firm can shape its
workers’ reputational incentives through appropriate contractual design.
We model this in the context of a contracting problem between a principal and two heterogenous
agents. The more talented of the two is labelled “high skilled” and the other one “low skilled”. Both
agents work for the principal during one period. In period 2, they contract with other principals
who draw inferences about their abilities from the publicly observable contracts and hard evidence
on transfers received in period 1. Observing an agent’s first-period output is informative of the
agent’s ability. Therefore, market inference relies on inverting the transfer scheme to back out
the agent’s performance. For example, the market can easily do so from a simple piece rate. In
contrast, if a transfer is offered in several output states, the contract creates ambiguity about the
worker’s underlying performance in these states. Thus, a principal can design a contract to be
perfectly revealing of the underlying performance in some output states (e.g., “rewarding” a high-
skilled agent when he produces high output by revealing the agent’s type) and to create ambiguity
about performance in other output states (e.g., “punishing” a high-skilled agent who produces low
output by giving him a transfer also associated with output states reached by low-skilled agents). In
other words, contracts create lotteries over future reputation that depend on the agents’ underlying
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performance. In the model, we focus on the more realistic case where the principal can only write
deterministic contracts, since stochastic contracts impose the strong requirement that the principal
can commit to lotteries.
As we show, the principal can profit from using the transfer scheme to pool performance-related
signals for low- and high-skilled agents in such a way that reputation increases with output. On
the one hand, this provides agents with reputational incentives which allow scaling back monetary
incentives. On the other hand, this also increases the total cost of implementing effort. Therefore,
the two functions of an incentive contract discussed above conflict with each other and a trade-off
between “good monetary incentives” and “good reputational incentives” arises. However, the prin-
cipal cares only about her monetary cost of providing incentives. We prove that the reputational
incentives created through imperfectly revealing contracts outweigh the increase in total imple-
mentation cost. Thus, optimal contracts always distort information revelation to the labor market
about the performance of an employer’s workers. Moreover, we show that the principal can benefit
from directly tying the incentives of her workers together by using relative performance measures,
since these provide her with more flexibility in creating lotteries over reputation than contracts
based on individual performance measures. This result offers a new rationale for the optimality
of relative performance contracts in a setup where the extant reasons for the optimality of such
compensation schemes are absent.
Related Literature
Career concerns models were introduced by Fama (1980) and Holmstro¨m (1982/99) and are typ-
ically cast in terms of symmetric learning : symmetrically informed firms try to infer the ability
of an agent from publicly observable measures of his past performance. Agents interfere with the
updating process by exerting effort to influence these performance measures. Ex ante, the parties
cannot internalize the impact of agents’ actions on reputation, either because no formal compen-
sation contracts can be written, or because of limited pre-commitment powers. This prevents the
dynamic incentive problem from simply collapsing to a static one.
Under symmetric learning, the impact of current actions on future reputation, and thus the strength
of reputational incentives, can either increase or decrease with improved information.1 However,
1Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999) characterize the impact of different information systems on implicit
incentives for situations where explicit incentives are not possible. Meyer and Vickers (1997) show that better
information can either enhance or weaken incentives in environments where implicit incentives are complemented
by explicit incentives. Incentives from the reputation enhancing effect of effort can be outweighed by disincentives
arising from the ratchet effect.
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many economic situations are characterized by sequential contracting where there is asymmetric
learning. Waldman (1984) is an early example for the impact of a firm’s actions on workers’
reputations. In his analysis, a firm learns about its workers’ types during the first period of their
employment and then decides on job assignments for period 2. Outsiders can observe the job offer
that a worker receives. Promotion to a job that requires higher ability sends a favorable signal to
the labor market and enhances the agent’s outside options. Retaining such an agent is therefore
more costly and, as a result, the firm sets the ability threshold for promotion too high compared
to the socially efficient level.2
If a principal can use superior information about agents’ abilities then the explicit compensation
scheme provides agents with direct incentives as well as with signals that affect their reputation.
The model of Za´bojn´ık and Bernhardt (2001) illustrates this dual role of explicit incentives. A firm
sets up a tournament in which ex ante identical workers compete in human capital investments
and are subject to a permanent human capital shock. The promotion scheme ranks workers by
their realized human capital. Reputational incentives arise because the expected human capital
shock for a tournament winner is larger than that for the next highest in rank, etc.3
A question that remains is whether tournaments can indeed be optimal contracts in such a
sequential contracting environment where parties can only commit to spot contracts. Our model
addresses this issue by excluding all the non-reputation based reasons for the use of relative
performance contracts that the literature has identified. First, correlation between stochastic
components in the outputs of different agents can be used to insure risk-averse agents against
common performance shocks (e.g., Lazear and Rosen (1981), Holmstro¨m (1982/99), Nalebuff and
Stiglitz (1983), Green and Stokey (1983), and Mookherjee (1984)).4 Second, relative performance
contracts can help internalize production externalities (e.g., Itoh (1991)). Third, the principal
can use relative performance contracts to create proper incentives when agents can monitor each
others’ efforts (e.g., Ma (1988), Che and Yoo (2001), and Laffont and Rey (2001)). Fourth,
if agents with other-regarding preferences interact, the principal may find it optimal to design
relative performance schemes that exploit the dependence of an agent’s utility on other agents’
2Other models with asymmetric learning are Greenwald (1986), Ricart I Costa (1988), Bernhardt (1995), and
Waldman (1990). In Lazear (1986) both the incumbent employer and outsiders obtain signals about workers’ abilities.
3The analysis abstracts from the strategic impact of promotion that arises in Waldman (1984) by assuming that
the firm can commit to its promotion rule ex ante. See Waldman (2003) for a discussion of conflicts between ex ante
incentives and ex post optimal promotion rules, and the role of commitment.
4Meyer and Vickers (1997) show that this static insurance effect can be outweighed by the negative impact on
implicit incentives of the ratchet effect in a dynamic model with career concerns.
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transfers to enhance incentives (e.g., Itoh (2004)).
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 contains the analysis
of the contracting problem. A discussion of our results is given in Section 4.
2 The Model
A principal (“she”) offers two agents (“he”) contracts to work for her during one period. It is
common knowledge that the agents are heterogeneous. We then denote as high-skilled (θ = H)
the more talented of the two and as low-skilled (θ = L) the other one.5 Both agents’ working lives
last for two periods and they have outside options providing life-time utility u = 0. An agent who
contracts with the principal in period 1 then faces contracting opportunities with other principals
in period 2. All parties are risk neutral but agents are subject to wealth and credit constraints that
prevent the principal from imposing negative transfers. Discount rates are normalized to one.
We begin by describing the first-period production technology. An agent of type θ ∈ {L,H} who
works for the principal in period 1 can achieve two possible type-dependent output levels, a low
one (qθl) and a high one (qθh). A high output level can only be reached if the agent exerts effort
(eθ = 1) at a private cost ψ. Formally,
Prob ( q˜ = qθh| eθ = 1) = Pθ, (1)
Prob ( q˜ = qθh| eθ = 0) = 0. (2)
Thus, both agents’ outputs depend only on their own effort and type.6 We also assume that the
high-skilled agent has a larger productivity of effort than the low-skilled one. That is,
PH > PL > 0. (3)
In sum, stochastic output accruing to the principal from an arbitrary agent can take on four possible
realizations q˜ ∈ Q ≡ {qLl, qLh, qHl, qHh}, where qLl < qLh 6= qHl < qHh.
Agents are initially privately informed about their own type. At the beginning of period 1, the prin-
cipal offers contracts that agents can accept or reject. Upon accepting, an agent non-cooperatively
chooses his effort level, which is not observable by any other party.7 At the end of period 1, output
realizes and agents receive transfers from the principal.
5Introducing uncertainty about the agents’ types would not alter our qualitative results. One could also introduce
a stage where the principal selects agents from a heterogeneous population to contract with (see our companion paper
Koch and Peyrache (2005)).
6This eliminates production externalities as a rationale for relative performance contracts.
7This rules out mutual monitoring as a rationale for relative performance contracts.
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We consider an environment where agents’ outputs are contractible but not publicly observable.8
Compensation schemes use monetary transfers t ∈ R+ and cheap-talk messages m ∈M . Contracts
map agents’ outputs to transfer/message (t/m) pairs which are hard evidence. Messages in the
form of reference letters, job titles, honorific rewards, and medals are often observed in employment
relations. While our model incorporates such messages, we do not attempt to capture their entire
richness. In our setup, messages serve the technical purpose of guaranteeing existence of equilibrium
by allowing the principal to make a distinction between two agents who receive the same monetary
transfers.
In period 2, agents leave the first principal9 and face new contracting opportunities with different
principals. We simply assume that kθ > 0 reflects an experienced agent’s productivity in a
competitive labor market and that ∆ k ≡ kH − kL > 0. Thus, the utility that an agent derives
from such a contractual relationship is increasing in his expected type.
All our qualitative results obtain under the above assumptions alone. To strengthen our findings,
we additionally introduce the possibility that the principal and agents can renegotiate about t/m
pairs at the end of period 1. As we show, monetary transfers and cheap talk messages influence an
agent’s reputation. Therefore, the principal could for example agree to swap the monetary transfer
which the agent is entitled to in exchange for a lower transfer or a cheap-talk message providing a
higher reputation in the labor market. We carry out our analysis in this framework to guarantee
that our findings are not an artefact of ruling out such renegotiation opportunities which are likely
to occur in most labor market settings.
To summarize, the timing of the model is as follows. At date 0, the first principal makes contract
offers to the two agents. Agents then accept or refuse the offer. If an agent rejects, he receives the
outside utility u = 0. If he accepts, he gets hired and the market observes the contract. Agents
who accepted the contract then non-cooperatively choose their effort levels and output realizes.
At the end period 1, agents receive a t/m pair according to their contracts or the outcome of their
renegotiation with the principal, and the relation with the first principal ends. In period 2, agents
who worked for the first principal enter the market for experienced labor, where future employers
8In our companion paper (Koch and Peyrache 2005) we model the complementary case where the principal can
only contract on variables that are publicly observable and her decision to reveal performance variables directly
impacts her contracting possibilities.
9Calzolari and Pavan (2005) make a similar assumption in their sequential contracting model. This assumption
is actually stronger than what we need for our results to hold. We extensively discuss its implications in Section 4.
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meet at most one of the agents. Agents can show employers their t/m pair or conceal one or both
components of it and get paid their expected productivity given the hard evidence they provided.
The above model structure is common knowledge. We solve for a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
and restrict attention to contracts that incite both agents to exert effort.10
3 Analysis
We start our analysis by solving backwards, first focusing on the labor market for experienced
labor, where agents solicit offers in period 2.
3.1 Belief formation
Upon meeting an agent who shows a transfer/message (t/m) pair, the market forms beliefs about
the probability β of facing a low-skilled individual. Given such beliefs β, the market’s posterior
about an agent with t/m pair (t,m) is:11
E[kθ|t,m] = β(t,m) kL + [1− β(t,m)] kH . (4)
Each contract induces a distribution over t/m pairs. Let X(φ) be the set of t/m pairs that are
observed on the equilibrium path under contract φ. For such t/m pairs (t,m) ∈ X(φ) beliefs β
above are formed using Bayes’ rule. Off the equilibrium path ((t,m) /∈ X(φ)), Bayes’ rule no longer
applies. One requirement that we impose is that market participants account for the possibility
of agents deliberately hiding from the labor market the t/m pair that they received. Therefore,
the market assigns to any agent who shows up empty handed ((t,m) = (0,∅)) the worst belief
associated with an equilibrium t/m pair (t,m) ∈ X(φ).
The fact that t/m pairs (which are hard evidence) serve as a signal to the labor market leads to
the first insight of our model: the value of a t/m pair to an agent does not only depend on its
monetary component but also on its impact on the assessment of the market regarding the agent’s
ability. The perceived transfer is the combination of the direct monetary value t and the reputation
E[kθ|t,m] associated with a t/m pair.
10A sufficient condition for this is that qLh−qLl ≥ 2ψPL . Then, even if there existed a contract that offered sufficiently
high reputational incentives to incite the high-skilled agent to exert effort at no monetary cost but not the low-skilled
one, it would pay to switch to a contract with no reputational incentives that implements effort by both agents (see
footnote 13).
11To avoid cumbersome notation, we do not index this expectation by the first-period contract.
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3.2 The Key Trade-Offs
In the contract design stage the principal anticipates the market beliefs that a contract will induce.
We start our analysis by first ignoring the possibility of renegotiation and focusing on two specific
contracts that base t/m pairs on each agent’s individual performance to provide the main intuition
underlying our results. Subsequently, we will admit the possibility of renegotiation and derive our
results considering case by case the admissible schemes in the contract space, moving from contracts
based on individual performance measures to contracts utilizing relative performance measures.
In the space of contracts, perfectly revealing t/m pairs are a polar case. They induce market beliefs
of facing either a high- or a low-skilled agent with probability one:
Definition 1 (Perfectly Revealing Transfer-Message Pairs and Contracts)
A transfer-message pair (t,m) ∈ R+ ×M is perfectly revealing if β(t,m) ∈ {0, 1}. A contract is
perfectly revealing if all of its t/m pairs are perfectly revealing.
Contract 1: A Perfectly Revealing Contract. Consider a contract that conditions
only on an individual agent’s output and stipulates distinct t/m pairs for each output state:
[(tHh,mHh) , (tHl,mHl) , (tLh,mLh) , (tLl,mLl)]. To induce agents to exert effort, t/m pairs must
satisfy the following incentive constraints:
Pθ [tθh + kθ] + (1− Pθ) [tθl + kθ]− ψ ≥ tθl + kθ,
⇔ tθh − tθl ≥ ψPθ , θ = L,H. (5)
Since the contract is perfectly revealing, the anticipated second-period wage kθ has no impact
on incentives. The limited liability constraint binds because kL > 0 and thus agents always
receive more than their outside option value u = 0.12 Thus, the optimal t/m pairs for this
perfectly revealing contract are given by
(
tHh =
ψ
PH
,mHh
)
,
(
tLh =
ψ
PL
,mLh
)
, (tHl = 0,mHl), and
(tLl = 0,mLl), where all messages are distinct. As shown in Table 1, no reputational incentives
arise and the principal has to rely exclusively on monetary incentives, incurring an expected
implementation cost of 2ψ.13
12The possibility of binding individual rationality constraints is analyzed in a related framework in our companion
paper (Koch and Peyrache 2005). We do not treat this case here since it does not add much economic insight but
greatly complicates expressions later in the analysis.
13From this we can derive the sufficient condition stated in footnote 10. The gain in expected output from making
the low-skilled agent exert effort is PL (qLh−qLl) and the expected cost of providing effort for both agents is bounded
above by 2ψ.
8
output t/m pair E [kθ| t,m]
qHh (tHh,mHh) k¯
qHl (0,mHl) k¯
}
no reputational incentives
qLh (tLh,mLh) k
qLl (0,mLl) k
}
no reputational incentives
Table 1: Perfectly revealing contract (Contract 1)
Contract 2: A Performance Standard Contract. Now consider slightly altering the contract
structure in Contract 1 by setting both tHl = tLh = t˜ and mHl = mLh = m˜. That is, we simply
pool the t/m pairs for a high-skilled agent in a low-output state and a low-skilled agent in a high-
output state. The contract sets two performance thresholds, qLh and qHh. Once the output of
an agent reaches a given performance standard, he receives a different t/m pair. In contrast to
Contract 1, it groups agents of different types in the intermediate tier of performances and therefore
is not perfectly revealing. In general, the design of performance standards affects the probabilities
of meeting the thresholds for the different types of agents, and controls how much information
about agents’ types is transmitted in each performance tier. As shown in Table 2, Contract 2
reveals a high-skilled agent as such if he produces high-output, guaranteeing him earnings k¯ in
period 2. If he produces low output, he is “punished” by being pooled with a low-skilled agent
who produces high-output, resulting in second-period earnings E
[
kθ| t˜, m˜
]
< k¯. Similarly, a wedge
is driven between the second-period earnings of a low-skilled agent. He is “rewarded” following
high output by being made undistinguishable from a high-skilled agent with low output, raising
the second-period earnings relative to the situation where he produces low output and is revealed
as low skilled: E
[
kθ| t˜, m˜
]
> k. Thus, the incentive constraint now becomes
t (qθh)− t (qθl)︸ ︷︷ ︸
monetary incentives
≥ ψ
Pθ
−
{
E [kθ| t (qθh) ,m (qθh)]− E [kθ| t (qθl) ,m (qθl)]
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
reputational incentives
. (6)
On the one hand, the reputational incentives that arise allow the principal to lower monetary
incentives, as can be seen from (6). On the other hand, pooling of t/m pairs forces the principal
to pay the monetary transfer t˜ also to a high-skilled agent reaching a low-output state. Thus,
a side effect of creating reputational incentives is raising the total implementation cost relative
to the perfectly revealing contract in Contract 1. However, what matters to the principal is the
monetary (and not the total) cost of implementing effort. Specifically, the above contract generates
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output t/m pair E [kθ| t,m]
qHh (t′Hh,mHh) k¯
qHl
(
t˜, m˜
)
E
[
kθ| t˜, m˜
]
< k¯
xy reputational incentives
qLh
(
t˜, m˜
)
E
[
kθ| t˜, m˜
]
> k
qLl (0,mLl) k
xy reputational incentives
Table 2: Performance standard contract (Contract 2)
the following reputational incentives: for the high-skilled agent we have
E
[
kθ|t′Hh,mHh
]− E [kθ|t˜, m˜] = kH − (1− PH) kH + PL kL1− PH + PL = PL1− PH + PL ∆ k, (7)
and, for the low-skilled agent, we have
E
[
kθ|t˜, m˜
]− E [kθ|0,mLl] = (1− PH) kH + PL kL1− PH + PL − kL = 1− PH1− PH + PL ∆ k. (8)
Thus, under this contract structure the principal optimally sets
t′Hh = max
{
t˜+
ψ
PH
− PL
1− PH + PL ∆ k, 0
}
and
t˜ = max
{
ψ
PL
− 1− PH
1− PH + PL ∆ k, 0
}
.
The contract has an expected monetary implementation cost of PH t′Hh+(1− PH + PL) t˜ which is
decreasing in the heterogeneity of experienced agents’ human capital, ∆ k. Consider the extreme
situation where ∆ k is sufficiently large that the principal can incite agents to exert effort at no cost
(i.e., t′Hh = t˜ = 0). By setting tHh = tLh = tHl = tLl = 0 and using three distinct messages mHh,
m˜, and mLl the principal benefits from reputational incentives despite a flat monetary scheme to
achieve a monetary implementation cost lower than under Contract 1.14
The comparison of Contracts 1 and 2 illustrates well the dichotomy between monetary and
perceived transfers that is key to the results in this paper. The principal has two currencies with
which she can reward agents: cash and reputation. However, there is a trade-off between “good
monetary incentives” and “good reputational incentives”. While a perfectly revealing contract
minimizes the total implementation cost, incentives must be provided entirely through monetary
transfers. An imperfectly revealing contract increases the total implementation cost but creates
14Technically, the messages guarantee the existence of an equilibrium by serving as a means of distinguishing
two identical monetary transfers in terms of the reputation that they confer. Without messages one would need to
introduce a grid for such transfers to achieve existence of an equilibrium in a situation where monetary transfers
differ just to create distinct reputations.
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reputational incentives, which can lower the expected monetary implementation cost well below 2ψ.
In our subsequent analysis we will see that it is always optimal for the principal to create ambigu-
ity about agents’ types rather than design perfectly revealing contracts. The principal cares only
about her monetary cost of providing incentives and the reputational incentives created through
imperfectly revealing contracts outweigh the increase in total implementation cost. In the preceding
examples agents are rewarded solely based on their own performance. In such Individual Perfor-
mance Measure (IPM) contracts (defined more precisely below) the principal can indirectly tie the
incentives of the agents together by pooling t/m pairs across different output states. Thus, IPM
contracts create lotteries over future earnings that depend on the agent’s individual performance
alone. As we show, the principal can improve upon IPM contracts by conditioning on multiple
agents’ performances. Such a Relative Performance Measure (RPM) contract (defined more pre-
cisely below) enables the principal to directly tie together agents’ incentives and induce lotteries
over future earnings that depend on the combination of individual performances rather than on a
single agent’s performance. Therefore, RPM contracts provide the principal with more flexibility
in creating lotteries over perceived transfers.
3.3 Renegotiation Proofness
Without any restrictions on contracts, an agent might offer to give up a monetary transfer that he
is entitled to in exchange for a t/m pair with a lower monetary transfer but a high reputational
value. Clearly, the principal would not refuse such offer. For this reason, we want contracts to
be such that the parties would not agree to renegotiate even when they have the opportunity to
do so. Requiring contracts to be renegotiation proof strengthens our findings because all results
go through also if we exclude renegotiation. Since the details of the renegotiation game are not
important, we simply present the renegotiation proofness conditions in the form of a definition:
Definition 2 (Renegotiation Proofness)
Given market beliefs β, a contract φ is renegotiation proof if ∀ (t′,m′) ∈ X(φ) and ∀ (t′′,m′′) ∈
R+ ×M , for which (t′′,m′′) 6= (t′,m′), none of the following conditions is violated:
(i) t′ > t′′ ⇒ t′ + E [kθ| t′,m′] > t′′ + E [kθ| t′′,m′′] ,
(ii) t′′ + E [kθ| t′′,m′′] > t′ + E [kθ| t′,m′] ⇒ t′′ > t′ or t′ = 0,
(iii) t′ = t′′ > 0 ⇒ E [kθ| t′,m′] = E [kθ| t′′,m′′] .
The definition states that there is no deviation that would be preferred by both the principal and
the agent from the t/m pairs stipulated by the contract φ to any other t/m pair. Condition (i)
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requires perceived transfers to be strictly increasing in their monetary component. Otherwise, an
agent could successfully renegotiate with the principal, offering her to replace the contractually
guaranteed t/m pair (t′,m′) by a pair (t′′,m′′) involving a lower monetary transfer but a higher
perceived transfer. The principal never renegotiates to a t/m pair with a higher monetary transfer
because agents cannot commit to repay her anything after having used the t/m pair as a signal in
the market. Conditions (ii) and (iii) guarantee that it is never profitable to buy a message from
the principal if the agent has cash. If t′ = 0, renegotiation is impossible since the agent lacks the
funds to bribe the principal. Definition 2 imposes on out-of-equilibrium beliefs that they support
an equilibrium where contracts are not renegotiated after output has realized.15 Note that the
above conditions also guarantee that an agent never has an incentive to break apart a t/m pair
and conceal one or all of its components.
To illustrate the impact of renegotiation proofness on contract design, reconsider the perfectly
revealing Contract 1. Suppose both that ψPL + kL < kH and that market beliefs are such that
the contract is not renegotiated. Then, a low-skilled agent receiving t/m pair (tLh,mLh) could
renegotiate to obtain (0,mHl), which yields a higher perceived transfer to the agent and decreases
the monetary cost for the principal. Thus, the assumed beliefs are inconsistent and renegotiation-
proofness is violated.
3.4 Individual Performance Measure Contracts
In this section, we restrict attention to Individual Performance (IPM) schemes only and derive
optimal contracts within this class of contracts (best IPM contracts), which provides the benchmark
for proving that the principal can gain from using relative performance measures.
Definition 3 (Individual Performance Measure Contract)
An Individual Performance Measure (IPM) contract φ ∈ ΦIPM is a function from the set of outputs
of a single agent to the set of transfer-message pairs, φ : Q→ R+ ×M .
Contracts 1 and 2 are two specimens of IPM contracts. We saw that Contract 2 is more profitable
than Contract 1 if the heterogeneity in experienced agents’ productivities, ∆ k, is sufficiently large.
Contract 2 can be shown to be the unique best IPM contract for some parameter values. We
relegate the complete analysis of the set of IPM contracts to Appendix A and focus on the two
other contracts that are best IPM contracts for some parameter values. This will help build the
15For example, the simplest out-of-equilibrium beliefs that sustain a contract φ that is renegotiation-proof on the
equilibrium path, are: β(t,m) = 1 if (t,m) /∈ X(φ).
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intuition for our result that perfectly revealing contracts are not optimal.
Contract 3. Consider slightly altering Contract 1 by setting mHl = mLl = m′. This has two
countervailing effects on incentives. Upon receiving t/m pair (0,m′) the expected productivity for
the agent is E[kθ|0,m′] ∈ (kL, kH). On the one hand, this creates reputational incentives for the
high-skilled agent because moving from the low-output state to the (perfectly revealing) high-output
state increases his second-period earnings from E[kθ|0,m′] to kH . On the other hand, this leads
to reputational disincentives because a low-skilled agent loses in terms of reputation by moving
from the low-output state to the high-output state. This decreases his second-period earnings from
E[kθ|0,m′] to kL. The larger marginal product of effort for the high-skilled agent (PH > PL) means
that he is more likely to reach a high-output state than the low-skilled agent. Intuitively, reducing
the monetary transfer in such states should be more important than keeping the high-output state
monetary transfer for the low-skilled agent low. Indeed, it can easily be shown that Contract 3 is
always more profitable than the perfectly revealing Contract 1. That is, on balance the principal
benefits from setting mHl = mLh and not revealing the agents’ types in the low-output states.16
Contracts 2 and 3 each create favorable reputational incentives and both can be shown to be
uniquely optimal in the class of IPM contracts for some parameter values. Both offer three distinct
t/m pairs, i.e., set two performance thresholds. Crossing a performance threshold increases the
monetary transfer and/or the reputation of an agent. However, for some parameter values, one
of the perceived transfers associated with intermediate and high output states becomes more
attractive than the t/m pair with the highest monetary transfer, and therefore the contracts
become vulnerable to renegotiation. Setting a single performance threshold and thereby limiting
the number of distinct t/m pairs solves this problem.
Contract 4. It offers a unique (t,m) pair whenever the agent achieves one of the high-output
states and a unique pair (0,m′) in any of the two low-output states. It can be shown that Contract
4 is uniquely optimal in the class of IPM contracts for some parameter values.17
By highlighting Contracts 2, 3, and 4 we have both shown how contract design affects reputational
incentives and characterized the contracts that are optimal in the class of IPM contracts.
16See the first part of the proof of Proposition 1 (IPM1 versus IPM5) in Appendix A
17See the last part of the proof of Proposition 1 (IPM6 uniquely optimal) in Appendix A
13
Proposition 1
In the class of Individual Performance Measure (IPM) contracts where both agents exert effort, the
profit maximizing contracts (best IPM contracts) are imperfectly revealing contracts with (multiple)
performance standards. Specifically, the best IPM contract has the structure of Contract 2, 3, or 4.
The details of the proof are relegated to Appendix A.18 The procedure is the following. Consider
all feasible IPM contracts. Start with a candidate contract structure and determine the associated
equilibrium perceived transfers. Then show that, given these transfers and their supporting market
beliefs, the principal has no incentive to deviate to a different contract, agents indeed exert effort,
and no renegotiation occurs.
Proposition 1 confirms the intuition that the principal always benefits from offering some form
of imperfectly revealing IPM contract that creates ambiguity about agents’ types. By using t/m
pairs to pool across output states reached by different types of agents, the principal distorts the
information transmission to the market and generates profit enhancing reputational incentives. The
next section shows that this insight extends to the entire set of deterministic contracts.
3.5 Individual versus Relative Performance Measure Contracts
In this section we consider the entire set of deterministic contracts Φ which can be partitioned into
two subclasses, Individual Performance Measure (IPM) contracts (the focus of Section 3.4) and
Relative Performance Measure (RPM) contracts:
Definition 4 (Relative Performance Measure Contract)
A Relative Performance Measure (RPM) contract φ ∈ ΦRPM is a mapping from the set of outputs
of both agents to the set of tuples of transfer-message pairs, that cannot be replicated using IPM
contracts.19
An RPM contract can be represented by a matrix as in Table 3. A symmetric RPM contract ignores
agents’ identities and thus contains fewer distinct t/m pairs. As for IPM contracts, a given RPM
contract φ induces a probability distribution over the t/m pairs (t,m) ∈ X(φ), which determines
the market’s equilibrium beliefs. Thus, the incentive constraint for the high-skilled agent, say he
18In the appendix, Contracts 2, 3 and 4 are denoted IPM4, IPM5 and IPM6, respectively.
19In the contract proposal game, the principal needs to specify what happens if only one agent accepts the contract.
Since in equilibrium both agents accept the contract, to keep things simple, we do not include this contingency in the
definition of the contract. For example, the contract could stipulate to then apply the perfectly revealing benchmark
IPM contract from Section 3.4.
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RPM Contract (φ ∈ ΦRPM)
Output of agent 2
Output of agent 1 qLl qLh qHl qHh
qHl (t1,m1), (t2,m2) (t3,m3), (t4,m4)
qHh (t5,m5), (t6,m6) (t7,m7), (t8,m8)
qLl (t
′
1,m
′
1), (t
′
2,m
′
2) (t
′
5,m
′
5), (t
′
6,m
′
6)
qLh (t
′
3,m
′
3), (t
′
4,m
′
4) (t
′
7,m
′
7), (t
′
8,m
′
8)
Symmetric RPM Contract
Output combinations qHl qHh
qLl (t1,m1), (t2,m2) (t3,m3), (t4,m4)
qLh (t5,m5), (t6,m6) (t7,m7), (t8,m8)
Table 3: RPM contracts
is agent 1, under an RPM contract φ ∈ ΦRPM is given by20
[PL t (qHh, qLh) + (1− PL) t (qHh, qLl)]− [PL t (qHl, qLh) + (1− PL) t (qHl, qLl)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
monetary incentives
≥ ψPH−
{[
PLE [kθ|φ1 (qHh, qLh)] + (1− PL) E [kθ|φ1 (qHh, qLl)]
]
−
[
PLE [kθ|φ1 (qHl, qLh)] + (1− PL) E [kθ|φ1 (qHl, qLl)]
]}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
reputational incentives
.
(9)
The low-skilled agent’s incentive constraint can be decomposed in a similar way.
Perfectly Revealing RPM Contracts. These contracts generate no reputational incentives in
equilibrium so that all that matters to an agent is the expected monetary reward received in each
of the possible output states. Because agents are risk neutral and their outputs are independent
random variables, conditioning contracts on the other agent’s output cannot decrease implemen-
tation cost. This is immediately apparent from a comparison of incentive constraints (6) and (9):
a perfectly revealing RPM contract cannot have a strictly lower monetary implementation cost
than the perfectly revealing IPM Contract 1, which itself is not a best IPM contract. As a direct
implication of this and Proposition 1 we obtain the following important result.
20We denote here by φ1 (q1, q2) the t/m pair received by agent 1 under contract φ for output pair (q1, q2).
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Proposition 2
Perfectly revealing contracts are not optimal.
This generalizes our finding in Proposition 1 that the principal wants to design the transfer scheme
so that it creates ambiguity about agents’ types ex post. The result that the optimal information
transmission is always imperfect is reminiscent of Calzolari and Pavan (2005)’s model. In their
sequential contracting model with pure asymmetric information, the first principal never fully
discloses information since this would eliminate all information rents in the second contractual
relationship. In our moral hazard model, full disclosure would eliminate all first-period reputational
incentives and force the principal to provide additional incentives for effort in monetary terms.
Strategic information revelation permits the principal to shift part of the moral hazard cost to
the future labor market. Thus, reputational incentives can be interpreted as an information rent
accruing to the first principal.
Asymmetric RPM Contracts (see Table 3). These contracts can only differ from symmetric
RPM contracts by adding a randomization over t/m pairs based on agents’ identities (and not
types). Since such contractual contingencies do not affect reputational incentives, they cannot
increase profits and the principal can restrict attention to symmetric RPM contracts only.
We have thus considerably narrowed the set of candidate optimal contracts to the best IPM
contracts from Proposition 1 and the class of imperfectly revealing symmetric RPM contracts.
Rank-Order Tournaments. Rank-order tournaments are the most prominent example of sym-
metric RPM contracts. A tournament selects the agent with the highest output as the winner, who
then receives the t/m pair (Be, “winner”), consisting of an explicit bonus Be ≥ 0 and a message
announcing the agent as the winner. The loser receives t/m pair (0, “loser”). If qHl > qLh the
high-skilled agent wins the tournament with certainty. That is, rank-order tournaments become
perfectly revealing contracts and cannot strictly dominate IPM contracts. In contrast, if qHl < qLh
they create the following reputational incentives:
R(Be) ≡ E [kθ| (Be, “winner”)]− E [kθ| (0, “loser”)] = [1− 2PL (1− PH)]∆ k. (10)
The combination of explicit bonus and reputational incentives generates a perceived bonus B =
Be + [1− 2PL (1− PH)]∆ k. Satisfying both agents’ incentive constraints21 requires that B ≥
21Recall that the individual rationality constraint is always satisfied. A detailed derivation of the following results
is available from the authors.
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max
{
ψ
PLPH
, ψPL(1−PH)
}
. Since wealth constraints prevent the principal from imposing negative
transfers, the explicit bonus is
Be = max
{
max
{
ψ
PLPH
,
ψ
PL (1− PH)
}
−R (Be) , 0
}
. (11)
Clearly, rank-order tournaments are optimal contracts whenever ∆ k is sufficiently large so that
reputational incentives are sufficient to implement effort. In such a setting Be = 0 and the principal
obtains the maximum possible expected profit. However, a rank-order tournament does not strictly
dominate the best IPM contracts, as the next result states:
Proposition 3
Rank-order tournaments are optimal if they implement effort using reputational incentives only.
Then, there exists a payoff equivalent IPM contract. Otherwise, there exists an IPM contract that
is strictly more profitable than rank-order tournaments.
The proof consists in showing that at least one of the best IPM contracts identified in the proof
of Proposition 1 achieves the same profit if Be = 0 and strictly dominates rank-order tournaments
whenever Be > 0.
Other Symmetric RPM Contracts. Proposition 3 raises two questions. Does there always
exist an RPM contract that generates at least the same profit as the best IPM contracts? Can
RPM contracts strictly dominate IPM contracts? Intuition suggests that both can be answered in
the affirmative: RPM contracts provide the principal with a larger number of t/m pairs and thus
more flexibility in designing lotteries over perceived transfers. Starting with the first question, if
the best IPM contract involves some perfectly revealing t/m pairs it is quite straightforward to
construct an RPM contract that guarantees the principal at least the same profit, while leaving
each agent with the same expected payoff as under the best IPM contract:
Lemma 1
If at least one t/m pair associated with an IPM contract is perfectly revealing, then there exists an
RPM contract that is payoff equivalent.
The intuition is simple: a payoff equivalent RPM contract can be obtained by adding noise to
the fully revealing transfers by making transfers in this output state contingent on the output of
the remaining agent. By doing so, the reputation effects and thus the expected cost of monetary
transfers remain unchanged (see the proof in Appendix B.2). Even though other RPM contracts
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can be found that also do at least as well as these IPM contracts (see the example in Appendix
B.3) the result provides a useful short cut.
Two caveats remain. First, whenever the best IPM contract does not contain any perfectly revealing
transfers (see Contract 4 in Section 3.4) we cannot rely on Lemma 1 to find a payoff equivalent
RPM contract. Indeed, any slight modification of the contract terms leads to discrete changes in
the reputation attached to the associated t/m pairs. Total implementation cost and reputational
incentives then change in complex ways. Second, the trick used in Lemma 1 does not enable us
to construct an RPM contract that strictly dominates the best IPM contract for some parameter
values.
Note that it is impossible to find an RPM contract which always strictly dominates IPM contracts
because the latter can have zero implementation cost and then are optimal contracts. Nevertheless,
in the proof of the following result we show that there exists a renegotiation-proof RPM contract
that overcomes the two caveats mentioned above. It is a simple “group bonus scheme” which
rewards both agents in the same way when both produce high output and provides an individualized
bonus to the high achiever if only one agent produces high output. This contract always produces at
least the same profit as Contract 4 from Section 3.4 and strictly dominates it for (non-degenerate)
parameter values for which it is the unique best IPM contract. From Proposition 1 we know that
any other candidate best IPM contract has a perfectly revealing t/m pair and a payoff equivalent
RPM contract exists by Lemma 1.
Proposition 4
Among the class of deterministic contracts which implement effort by all agents, RPM contracts
weakly dominate IPM contracts. For a non-degenerate range of parameter values, RPM contracts
are strictly more profitable than IPM contracts.
Proposition 4 tells us that the complex contracting problem can be reduced to a search on the
subclass of imperfectly revealing symmetric RPM contracts. This provides a new rationale for the
use of relative performance contracts since the assumptions in our model were deliberately chosen
so that the known reasons for the use of such contracts are absent.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
Any reward scheme both provides incentives and transmits information to the labor market regard-
ing an agent’s productivity. As a consequence the explicit incentive contract both directly affects
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effort incentives through monetary transfers and indirectly impacts effort by controlling the flow of
information to the market.
In our setup, the production process of one agent is independent of that of the other. Nevertheless,
since output contains information about the agent’s ability it is optimal for the principal to tie the
incentives of the two agents together by pooling t/m pairs across different output states (Proposition
2). This permits her to create ambiguity about the agent’s type because then the market cannot
back out perfectly the output that the agent realized by inverting the incentive scheme. Under such
an imperfectly revealing contract, the agent faces a lottery over future reputation that depends on
the output he produces. Specifically, the principal chooses a contract that partitions the joint
distribution of agents’ t/m pairs in such a way that, for at least one type of agent, the reputation
derived from using t/m pairs as a signal in the labor market is increasing in the output that he
produces. Even though a trade-off between “good monetary incentives” (low total implementation
cost) and “good reputational incentives” arises, the principal can create sufficient reputational
incentives to more than compensate for the increase in total implementation cost resulting from
pooling transfers across output states.
Ideally, the principal would want to write a stochastic contract to fine tune these lotteries over
perceived transfers. However, the principal might only be able to credibly commit to deterministic
incentive schemes (as in our setup) since in contrast to stochastic contracts these are easy to verify
by third parties such as courts. Then the contract space is partitioned into Individual Performance
Measure (IPM) contracts and Relative Performance Measure (RPM) contracts. The principal can
benefit from using relative performance measures since they provide her with more flexibility22
in creating lotteries over perceived transfers than individual performance measures. Even though
agents’ wealth constraints and renegotiation proofness constrain contract choices, imperfectly
revealing symmetric RPM contracts dominate IPM contracts (Proposition 4). Thus, the complex
contracting problem can be reduced to a search on the subclass of imperfectly revealing symmetric
RPM contracts. This provides a new rationale for the use of relative performance contracts based
on the informational externalities created by compensation schemes.
Undoubtedly, a key assumption of our paper is that agents switch employers at the end of the first
contracting period. We restricted our setup along this dimension to bring out clearly the hitherto
unstudied informational spill-overs caused by compensation schemes in sequential contracting with
moral hazard. The effects of asymmetric learning for turnover have been extensively analyzed.
22However, remember that, by definition, RPM contracts cannot be replicated using IPM contracts only.
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Typically, in such models the informational asymmetry between current employer and outsiders
causes a lemons problem that prevents movements of workers across firms in equilibrium unless
there are exogenous sources of turnover (e.g., Greenwald (1986)) or worker-firm matches have a
random component unrelated to ability (e.g., Lazear (1986) and Owan (2004)). While there is some
empirical support for adverse selection23, both Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstro¨m (1994b) and Lazear
and Oyer (2004) document substantial turnover at all hierarchy levels of firms. This suggests that
in these environments adverse selection is not a severe problem since otherwise the market for
experienced labor could not be active (Greenwald 1986). Gibbs, Ierulli, and Milgrom (2002) even
reports a positive effect on income ensuing a move to another firm based on Swedish personnel
records.
Our assumption that all agents move to new employers is in fact stronger than necessary for our
results to hold. What is key for reputational incentives to arise in equilibrium is that there is some
heterogeneity within the average cohort of agents leaving the principal. This then allows to affect
agents’ incentives by pooling t/m pairs across output states in the same way as in our model because
the market does not expect all agents to have the same type. For example, production technology
might impose “slot constraints” for positions higher in the hierarchy that prevent the firm from
retaining all its workers once they have become too experienced for the introductory level job.
Notably, in internal labor markets, constraints on positions very often imply that an upward career
movement means switching to other departments. This restricts the scope for adverse selection
on internal movements in the firm. Moreover, centrally set compensation rules can serve as a
commitment device to credibly avoid adverse selection in employee turnover. Baker et al. (1994a,
p.913) present evidence that such rules place a “wedge between an employee’s pay and what pay
would be in an external spot market” and thus prevent a firm from giving agents with favorable
performance signals sufficiently large raises to retain them.
Another way to extend our model would be to allow for an agent’s productivity to be determined
both by ability and the match between the agent’s human capital and the job that a principal can
offer (e.g., Antel (1985) and McLaughlin (1991)). The turnover patterns from our setup would
then arise endogenously if the match between a principal and skills for experienced agents were
always better in a different segment of the labor market, regardless of agents’ ability levels. For
example, productive abilities and resources under control might be complements (Rosen 1982).
Then, it would be efficient for experienced agents to move to a bigger firm if they all sufficiently
enhanced their human capital through learning by doing in period 1 (while still differing in the
23Gibbons and Katz (1991) find an adverse selection effect for white collar workers, which however is not apparent
for workers with less than two years of tenure (p.367).
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attained productivity levels).
Given the assumptions underlying our setup the implications of the model should apply mainly
to markets where there are high rates of turnover, as in the professional service industry. Here
employee turnover can be as high as 20 to 25 percent of the workforce per year (Maister (2003),
p.15). Young professionals gather substantial amounts of experience and are generally viewed as
“free agents” who invest primarily in general human capital (Groysberg and Nanda 2002). Despite
the importance of reputational incentives for individuals’ careers, compensation is not tightly
linked to individual’s performance in the early stages of their career. In fact, partnerships in
human capital intensive professional services tend to avoid very informative measures of individual
performance.24 Instead firms employ up-or-out systems that resemble the simple imperfectly
revealing performance standard contracts in this paper.25 Adverse selection is not a serious issue
in this market since individuals who leave professional service firms are generally not viewed as
lemons but rather enter very attractive and highly remunerated positions (Maister 2003). Being
employed for some time in such a firm provides young professionals with experience, training,
and the cachet of a renowned firm. These credentials help them enter prime positions that they
could not have obtained as fast by another route (Maister 2003). Despite their attractiveness,
professional firms do not make young workers pay up front with an entrance fee. Instead, as our
model suggests, they (partially)26 extract these gains through low pay to young workers, mea-
sured relative to their qualifications (e.g., Rebitzer and Taylor (1995) and Tadelis and Levin (2005)).
The setup in this paper presents a first step in exploring the impact of informational externalities
generated by compensation schemes on contract design. Interesting directions for future research
are incorporating the job transition decision into the model and extending the analysis to more
general production technologies.
24E.g., see evidence on law firms in Gilson and Mnookin (1985).
25Typically, a promotion decision has to be made after a set number of years, e.g, 6-10 years in law firms (Gilson
and Mnookin 1989). Thus firms commit to not opportunistically keep qualified individuals at the associate level
indefinitely (e.g., Gilson and Mnookin (1989) and Rebitzer and Taylor (1995)).
26Rebitzer and Taylor (1995) provide evidence for substantial employment rents in prestigious large law firms.
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IPM Contract (φ ∈ ΦIPM)
Output (qθ i) qHh qLh qHl qLl
Label a b c d
φ(qθ i) (ta,ma) (tb,mb) (tc,mc) (td,md)
Table 4: IPM contracts
A Appendix: Individual Performance Measure Contracts
To easily identify the output states in which a t/m pair is given under an IPM contract, we
use subscripts for the components of t/m pairs. These correspond to the letters assigned to the
particular output states listed in Table 4. For example, ta denotes the monetary transfer associated
with output state a, and tab is a short-hand for ta = tb.
The following two rather straightforward results already greatly reduce the set of candidate IPM
contracts.
Lemma 2
Under any IPM contract, if a t/m pair associated to low output is perfectly revealing, then the
principal always sets the corresponding monetary transfer equal to zero.
Proof.
Note first that it can never be optimal to offer a larger monetary transfer in the low state than in the high
state. Now, consider a positive monetary transfer for an agent of type θ who is in the low-output state.
Reducing this monetary transfer relaxes the agent’s incentive constraint and, therefore, the principal can
also reduce the expected monetary transfer to the agent in the high-output state by the same amount. Since
the t/m pair in the low-output state is perfectly revealing, this modification in monetary transfers does not
change the reputation effect of moving from low to high output.
Lemma 3
Under any IPM contract that gives agents the same t/m pairs in all low-output states, the principal
always sets the corresponding monetary transfer equal to zero.
Proof.
Decreasing the monetary transfer in low-output states has no impact on the reputation, but relaxes the
agents’ incentive constraints.
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Transfer/message pairs Profit
Perfectly revealing IPM contracts
1. [(ta,ma), (tb,mb), (tc,mc), (td,md)] ΠIPM1 =
 qˆ − 2ψ if ∆ kψ ≤ 1PL ,not renegotiation proof otherwise.
IPM contracts with three distinct t/m pairs
2. [(tab,mab), (tc,mc), (td,md)] ΠIPM2 =
{
qˆ − PH+PLPH ψ − PL∆ k if ∆ kψ > PH−PLPHPL ,
qˆ − PH+PLPL ψ + PH ∆ k otherwise.
3. [(tad,mad), (tb,mb), (tc,mc)] ΠIPM3 = qˆ − 1+2PHPH ψ −∆ k.
4. [(ta,ma), (tbc,mbc), (td,md)] ΠIPM4 =

qˆ − 1+2PLPL ψ +∆ k
if PH ≤ 12 and ∆ kψ < C1,
or PH > 12 and
∆ k
ψ ≤ C2,
qˆ − ψ + PHPL1+PL−PH ∆ k if PH ≤ 12 and C1 ≤ ∆ kψ < C2,
not renegotiation proof if PH > 12 and C2 <
∆ k
ψ < C1,
qˆ if ∆ kψ ≥ max {C1, C2} ,
C1 ≡ 1+PL−PHPL(1−PH) , and C2 ≡ 1+PL−PHPL PH .
5. [(ta,ma), (tb,mb), (tcd,mcd)] ΠIPM5 =

qˆ − 2ψ + PH−PL2−PH−PL ∆ k if ∆ kψ < C3,
qˆ − ψ − PL(1−PH)2−PH−PL ∆ k if C3 ≤ ∆ kψ < C4,
not renegotiation proof otherwise,
C3 ≡ 2−PH−PLPH(1−PL) and C4 ≡ 2−PH−PLPL(1−PL) .
IPM contracts with two distinct t/m pairs
6. [(tab,mab), (tcd,mcd)] ΠIPM6 =
{
qˆ − PL+PHPL ψ + PH−PL2−PH−PL ∆ k if ∆ kψ < C5,
qˆ otherwise,
C5 ≡ (PH+PL)(2−PH−PL)PL(PH−PL) .
Table 5: IPM contracts for which both agents exert effort
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A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We only consider contracts under which both types of agents exert effort.27 Thus, all contracts
ensure an expected output of
qˆ ≡ qHl + PH (qHh − qHl) + qLl + PL (qLh − qLl). (12)
Using Lemmas 2 and 3 we can characterize all types of IPM contracts, and their respective profits
are given in Table 5 (the derivation of this table is available from the authors).
The proof below consists in showing that one of the candidate contracts always dominates the other
IPM contracts.
1. IPM1 is strictly dominated by IPM5.
If IPM5 is not renegotiation proof, then IPM1 is not either. This stems from the fact that 1PL <
2−PH−PL
PL(1−PL) ≡ C4 since
2−PH−PL
1−PL − 1 =
1−PH
1−PL > 0. Moreover, if
• ∆ kψ < min
{
C3,
1
PL
}
, then Π5 −Π1 = PH−PL2−PH−PL∆ k > 0.
• C3 ≤ ∆ kψ < 1PL , then Π5 −Π1 = ψ −
PL(1−PH)
2−PH−PL∆ k > 0 since C4 ≡
2−PH−PL
PL(1−PL) >
1
PL
> ∆ kψ .
2. IPM2 is strictly dominated by IPM5 or IPM6.
1. Suppose that IPM5 is renegotiation proof, i.e., ∆ kψ < C4. Given that C4 − PH−PLPH PL =
PH (1−PH)+PL (1−PL)
PHPL(1−PL) > 0, the number of cases to consider are reduced. Then, if
• ∆ kψ < min
{
C3,
PH−PL
PHPL
}
, then Π5−Π2 = PH−PLPL ψ−PH ∆ k+
PH−PL
2−PH−PL∆ k >
PH−PL
PL
ψ−
PH ∆ k > 0, since ∆ kψ <
PH−PL
PHPL
.
• C3 ≤ ∆ kψ < PH−PLPHPL < C4, then Π5 − Π2 =
PH
PL
ψ − 2PH−2PHPL+PL−P 2H2−PH−PL ∆ k.
Since ψ > PHPLPH−PL∆ k this is greater than
[
P 2H
PH−PL −
2PH−2PHPL+PL−P 2H
2−PH−PL
]
∆ k =
PL[PH(1−PL)+PL(1−PH)]
(PH−PL)(2−PH−PL) ∆ k > 0.
• PH−PLPHPL ≤ ∆ kψ < C3, then Π5 −Π2 = −
PH−PL
PH
ψ + PL∆ k + PH−PL2−PH−PL∆ k > −
PH−PL
PH
ψ +
PL∆ k ≥ 0, since PH−PLPHPL ≤ ∆ kψ .
• max
{
C3,
PH−PL
PHPL
}
≤ ∆ kψ < C4, then Π5−Π2 = PLPH ψ+PL∆ k−
PL(1−PH)
2−PH−PL∆ k =
PL
PH
ψ+
PL(1−PL)
2−PH−PL∆ k > 0.
2. Suppose now that IPM5 is not renegotiation proof, i.e., ∆ kψ ≥ C4, then if
• C4 ≤ ∆ kψ < C5, then Π6 − Π2 = − (PH−PL)(PL+PH)PL PH ψ +
PH−PL
2−PH−PL∆ k +
PL∆ k. Since ψ ≤ 1C4 ∆ k =
PL (1−PL)
2−PH−PL ∆ k this expression is greater or equal to[
− (1−PL)(PH−PL)(PL+PH)PH (2−PH−PL) +
PH−PL
2−PH−PL + PL
]
∆ k = PL (1−PL)(PL+PH)PH (2−PH−PL) > 0.
27See footnote 10 for a sufficient condition on the parameters.
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• C5 ≤ ∆ kψ , then Π6 −Π2 = PH+PLPH ψ + PL∆ k > 0.
3. IPM3 is strictly dominated by IPM5 or by IPM6.
1. Suppose IPM5 is renegotiation proof, i.e., ∆ kψ < C4, then if
• ∆ kψ < C3, then Π5 −Π3 = ψPH +∆ k +
PH−PL
2−PH−PL∆ k > 0.
• C3 ≤ ∆ kψ < C4, then Π5 −Π3 = 1+PHPH ψ +
(2−PH) (1−PL)
2−PH−PL ∆ k > 0.
2. Suppose now that IPM5 is not renegotiation proof, i.e., ∆ kψ ≥ C4 :
• C4 ≤ ∆ kψ < C5. Then Π6−Π3 =
PL+PHPL−P 2H
PHPL
ψ+ 2 (1−PL)2−PH−PL∆ k > −
PH
PL
ψ+ 2 (1−PL)2−PH−PL∆ k.
Since ψ ≤ ∆ kC4 =
PL (1−PL)
2−PH−PL ∆ k this expression is greater or equal to
(2−PH) (1−PL)
2−PH−PL ∆ k > 0.
• C5 ≤ ∆ kψ . Then Π6 −Π3 = 1+2PHPH ψ +∆ k > 0.
Hence, only IPM5, IPM6, or IPM4 can be optimal in the class of IPM contracts. Each of these
contracts can be shown not to be always dominated by one of the other two candidate contracts:
1. Looking at the profits of IPM contracts in Table 5, it is obvious that IPM4 is optimal whenever
∆ k
ψ ≥ max {C1, C2} and that IPM6 is optimal whenever ∆ kψ ≥ C5. For example, fix PL = 0.4,
then max {C1, C2} < C5 for PH < 0.76 and IPM4 is uniquely optimal among IPM contracts
for values of ∆ kψ between these thresholds.
2. Similarly, IPM6 can be uniquely optimal since the above inequality is reversed for larger
values of PH .
3. Finally, IPM5 is the best IPM contract for PH > 12 and C2 <
∆ k
ψ < min{C1, C4}:28
• IPM5 strictly dominates IPM6 for ∆ kψ < C4. First, recall that C4 > C3 and note that
C5 − C4 = (2−PH−PL)
2
(PH−PL)(1−PL) > 0. Hence, there are only two cases to consider:
– ∆ kψ < C4, then ΠIPM5 −ΠIPM6 = PH−PLPL ψ > 0.
– C3 ≤ ∆ kψ < C4, then ΠIPM5 −ΠIPM6 = PHPL ψ−
PH(1−PL)
2−PH−PL ∆ k > 0, since
∆ k
ψ < C4 ≡
2−PH−PL
PL(1−PL) .
• IPM4 is not renegotiation proof for PH > 12 and C2 < ∆ kψ < C1.
28This interval is non-degenerate. One can easily see that for PH >
1
2
we have C1 > C2 and C4 − C2 = [(2PH −
1) (1− PL)− (PH − PL) (PH + PL − 1)]/[PH PL (1− PL)] > (2PH − 1) (1− PH)/[PH PL (1− PL)] > 0.
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B Appendix: Relative Performance Measure Contracts
B.1 Proof of Proposition 3
The expected profit under a rank-order tournament (T ) is given by
ΠT =

qˆ − ψPLPH + [1− 2PL (1− PH)]∆ k if PH ≤ 12 and ∆ kψ < TC1,
qˆ − ψPL(1−PH) + [1− 2PL (1− PH)]∆ k if PH >
1
2 and
∆ k
ψ < TC2,
qˆ if ∆ kψ ≥ max {TC1, TC2} ,
(13)
where TC1 ≡ 1PLPH [1−2PL(1−PH)] , and TC2 ≡
1
PL(1−PH) [1−2PL(1−PH)] .
1. IMP4 dominates T whenever it is renegotiation proof
First, consider PH ≤ 12 . Note that then TC1 = max{TC1, TC2} and C2 = max{C1, C2}. Since
TC1 − C2 = PH − PL + 2PL (1− PH) (1 + PL − PH)
PL PH [1− 2PL (1− PH)] > 0 (14)
we have that ΠT = qˆ ⇒ ΠIPM4 = qˆ. Thus, what remains to be considered are the cases:
• C1 ≤ ∆ kψ < C2. Then ΠIPM4−ΠT = 1−PH (1+2PL)PL PH ψ+2PL (1−PH)∆ k > 0 since 1−PH (1+
2PL) > 1− PH (1 + 2PH) ≥ 0 and PH ≤ 12 .
• C1 ≤ ∆ kψ < C2 (< TC1). Then ΠIPM4 −ΠT > 0 if
∆ k
ψ
< C2
1− PL PH
(1− PH) {1 + PL [1− 2 (1 + PL − PH)]}︸ ︷︷ ︸
>1
. (15)
This condition is satisfied since the right-hand side (RHS) is larger than C2.
Now consider PH > 12 . Then, TC2 − C1 > 0 and we again have that ΠT = qˆ ⇒ ΠIPM4 = qˆ.
Thus, what remains to be considered are the cases:
• ∆ kψ ≤ C2 (< C1 < TC2). Then ΠIPM4 −ΠT > 0 if
∆ k
ψ
< C1
1− PL (1− PH)
1− PL (1− PH)− PL [1 + 2 (1− PH)(PH − PL)] . (16)
The denominator on the RHS is positive since
PL (1− PH)− PL [1 + 2 (1− PH)(PH − PL)] = 1− PL (2− PH) + 2 (1− PH)(PH − PL)
> 1− PL (2− PH) > (1− PH)2 > 0,
and it clearly is smaller than the numerator. Hence, the expression on the RHS of (16) is
larger than C1 and the condition is satisfied.
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• C2 ≤ ∆ kψ < C1, IPM4 is not renegotiation proof.
2. IMP6 dominates T whenever IPM4 is not renegotiation proof
Two case need to be considered:
• C2 ≤ C5 ≤ ∆ kψ < C1 (< TC2). Then we have ΠIPM6 = qˆ > ΠT .
• C2 ≤ ∆ kψ < C1 < C5. Then, ΠIPM6 −ΠT > 0 if
∆ k
ψ
<
(2− PH − PL) [1− (1− PH) (PL + PH)]
2 (1− PH) [1− PL (2− PH − PL)]
1
PL (1− PH) . (17)
The expression on the RHS being greater than C1, the condition is satisfied. Indeed, we have
that 1PL (1−PH) > C1 and the remaining fraction is larger than one since
(2− PH − PL) [1− (1− PH) (PL + PH)]− 2 (1− PH) [1− PL (2− PH − PL)]
= (PH − PL) [2PH − 1 + PL (1− PH) + PH (1− PH)] > 0 (since PH > 12).
B.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Assume, that the contract promises the high-skilled agent a perfectly revealing t/m pair (tHs,mHs)
in output state s ∈ {l, h}.29 Suppose first that tHs > 0. Now construct an RPM contract by setting
t(qHs, qLh) = tHs + η and t(qHs, qLl) = tHs − αη, while leaving all other transfers and messages as
under the initial IPM contract. Obviously, the new transfers under the RPM are perfectly revealing,
just as tHs was. Therefore, the expected perceived transfer that the agent receives in output state
s is equal under both contracts if
PL η − (1− PL)αη = 0 ⇒ α = PL1− PL .
For such an η, the expected perceived transfer for the agent and the expected profit of the principal
are equal under both the RPM contract and the initial IPM contract.
If tHs = 0, the principal can easily construct an RPM contract by impacting messages rather than
monetary transfers. Indeed let the principal offer t(qHs, qLh) = t(qHs, qLl) = 0 in conjunction with
m(qHs, qLh) 6= m(qHs, qLl), which are distinct from other messages under the contract. Obviously,
this keeps both t/m pairs perfectly revealing and the expected monetary cost remains unchanged.
Finally, such RPM contracts inherit renegotiation proofness from the IPM contract for all parameter
values.
29The proof is analogous for the low-skilled agent.
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B.3 Example: An RPM Contract that dominates IPM5
As an illustration, we show that strict dominance can be obtained by an RPM contract relative to
IPM5 (a candidate best IPM contract with a t/m pair that is perfectly revealing).
Consider the following RPM contract:
RPM1 qHh
θ = H
qHl
qLh [(t2,m2), (t2,m2)] [(t1,m1), (0,m3)]
θ = L
qLl [(0,m3), (t2,m2)] [(0,m3), (0,m3)]
Given that both agents exert effort under RPM1, beliefs about the agents’ types are:
E [kθ| t1,m1] = kL, (18)
E [kθ| t2,m2] = kH + PL kL1 + PL , (19)
E [kθ| 0,m3] = (1− PH) kH + (1− PL) kL2− PH − PL . (20)
The high-skilled agent’s incentive and wealth constraints imply that30
t2 =

ψ
PH
− 1−2PL+PHPL(1+PL)(2−PH−PL) ∆ k if
∆ k
ψ < C6
0 otherwise,
(21)
where C6 ≡ (1+PL)(2−PH−PL)PH(1−2PL+PHPL) . In conjunction with the wealth constraint the low-skilled agent’s
incentive constraint determines t1:
t1 =

1−PL
PL(1−PH) ψ +
1−PH
2−PH−PL ∆ k if
∆ k
ψ < C6
ψ
PL(1−PH) +
(1−3PH+PL+P 2H)
(1−PH)(2−PH−PL)(1+PL) ∆ k
if C6 ≤ ∆ kψ and C8 ≥ 0
or C6 ≤ ∆ kψ < C7 and C8 < 0
0 if ∆ kψ ≥ max {C6, C7} and C8 < 0,
(22)
where C7 ≡ (2−PH−PL)(1+PL)PL (−1+3PH−PL−P 2H) and C8 ≡ 1− 3PH + PL + P
2
H . Recall that IPM5 is renegotiation
proof if and only if ∆ kψ <
2−PH−PL
PL(1−PL) ≡ C4. Therefore, we only have to consider this range of values.
• No renegotiation between t/m pairs (t1,m1) and (t2,m2)
We always have that t1 > t2 if t2 > 0. Therefore, the conditions in Definition 2 require
that t1 + kL > t2 + E [kθ| t2,m2]. For ∆ kψ < C6, we have t1 − t2 + kL − E [kθ| t2,m2] =
PH−PL
PHPL(1−PH) ψ > 0. If
∆ k
ψ ≥ C6 (i.e. t2 = 0), we have t1 + E [kθ| t1,m1] − t2 −
E [kθ| t2,m2] ≥ 1PL(1−PH) ψ −
1−2PL+PHPL
(1−PH)(1+PL)(2−PH−PL) ∆ k. This expression is positive if
∆ k
ψ <
(2−PH−PL)(1+PL)
PL(1−2PL+PHPL) ≡ C9, which is implied by the condition
∆ k
ψ < C4 and C9 − C4 =
(2−PH−PL)2
PL(1−2PL+PHPL)(1−PL) > 0.
30Note that 1− 2PL + PHPL > 0 for all possible values of PH and PL.
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• No renegotiation between t/m pairs (t1,m1) and (0,m3)
Definition 2 requires that t1 + E [kθ| t1,m1] > E [kθ| 0,m3]. For ∆ kψ < C6, we have t1 +
E [kθ| t1,m1] − E [kθ| 0,m3] = 1−PLPL(1−PH) ψ > 0. For
∆ k
ψ ≥ C6, we have t1 + E [kθ| t1,m1] −
E [kθ| 0,m3] ≥ 1PL(1−PH) ψ −
PH(1−2PL+PHPL)
(1−PH)(1+PL)(2−PH−PL) ∆ k. This expression is positive if
∆ k
ψ <
(2−PH−PL)(1+PL)
PHPL(1−2PL+PHPL) =
1
PH
C9, which is implied by ∆ kψ < C4 < C9.
Hence, the expected profit for the range ∆ kψ < C4 is:
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ΠRPM1 =
 qˆ − 2ψ +
PH−PL
2−PH−PL ∆ k if
∆ k
ψ < min{C4, C6}
qˆ − ψ − PL(1−3PH+PL+P
2
H)
(2−PH−PL) (1+PL) ∆ k if C6 ≤
∆ k
ψ < C4.
(23)
Next, we compare the profits of RPM2 and IPM5. Note that C4 > C3. Moreover, since C6 −C3 =
PL (2−PH−PL)2
PH (1−PL)(1−2PL+PLPH) > 0 only the following cases have to be considered:
• ∆ kψ < C3, then ΠRPM1 −ΠIPM5 = 0.
• C3 ≤ ∆ kψ < min{C4, C6}, then ΠRPM1 −ΠIPM5 = −ψ + PH(1−PL)2−PH−PL∆ k ≥ 0, since ∆ kψ ≥ C3.
• C6 ≤ ∆ kψ < C4, then ΠRPM1 −ΠIPM5 = PHPL1+PL∆ k > 0.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Proposition 1 lists IPM4, IPM5, and IPM6 as best IPM contracts. By Lemma 1, there always exists
a payoff-equivalent RPM contract to the two candidate contracts IPM4 and IPM5. Thus, to prove
the result it is sufficient to construct an RPM that always performs at least as well as IPM6 and
strictly dominates it for parameter values for which it is the best IPM contract.
RPM2 dominates IPM6.
RPM2 qHh
θ = H
qHl
qLh [(t1,m1), (t1,m1)] [(t1,m1), (0,m2)]
θ = L
qLl [(0,m2), (t1,m1)] [(0,m3), (0,m3)]
Given that both agents exert effort under RPM2, beliefs about the agents’ types are:
E [kθ| t1,m1] = PH kH + PL kL
PH + PL
, (24)
E [kθ| 0,m2] = PL (1− PH) kH + PH (1− PL) kL
PH + PL − 2PHPL , (25)
E [kθ| 0,m3] = kH + kL2 . (26)
31It can easily be shown that C6 can be either larger or smaller than C4. Note that t2 > 0 since C8 < 0 ⇒ C7 >
C4 >
∆ k
ψ
.
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The high-skilled agent’s incentive constraint requires that
t1 ≥ t¯ ≡ ψ
PH
− (PH − PL)
(
PH + PL + P 2L − PHPL
)
2 (PH + PL) (PH + PL − 2PHPL) ∆ k. (27)
Similarly, the low-skilled agent’s incentive constraint requires that
t1 ≥ t ≡ ψ
PL
− (PH − PL)
(
PH + PL + P 2H − PHPL
)
2 (PH + PL) (PH + PL − 2PHPL) ∆ k. (28)
Note that t¯ > t if and only if ∆ kψ >
2 (PH+PL−2PHPL)
PHPL(PH−PL) ≡ C10.
Together, the incentive and wealth constraints imply that t1 ≥ max {t, t¯, 0 } . We have that
t > 0 if and only if ∆ kψ <
2 (PH+PL)(PH+PL−2PHPL)
PL(PH−PL)(PH+PL+P 2H−PHPL)
≡ C11 and t¯ > 0 if and only if
∆ k
ψ <
2 (PH+PL)(PH+PL−2PHPL)
PH(PH−PL)(PH+PL+P 2L−PHPL)
≡ C12. Conveniently, C10 > C11 > C12, since C10 − C11 =
2 (PH+PL−2PH PL)2
PL PH (PH−PL)(PH+PL+P 2H−PHPL)
> 0 and C11−C12 = 2 (PH+PL)(PH+PL−2PHPL)
2
PHPL (PH+PL+P 2L−PHPL)(PH+PL+P 2H−PHPL)
>
0. Hence,
t1 =

ψ
PL
− (PH−PL)(PH+PL+P
2
H−PHPL)
2 (PH+PL)(PH+PL−2PHPL) ∆ k if
∆ k
ψ < C11,
0 otherwise.
(29)
The contract is renegotiation proof if and only if for ∆ kψ < C11 we have that t1 + E [kθ| t1,m1] >
max {E [kθ| 0,m2] , E [kθ| 0,m3]}. Note that E [kθ| 0,m3]− E [kθ| 0,m2] = PH−PL2 (PH−PL−2PL PH) ∆ k >
0. Moreover, t1 + E [kθ| t1,m1] − E [kθ| 0,m3] = ψPL −
PH (PH−PL)
2 (PH+PL−2PHPL) ∆ k. This expression is
positive if ∆ kψ <
2 (PH+PL−2PHPL)
PHPL(PH−PL) ≡ C13. Hence, renegotiation proofness follows from C13 − C11 =
2 (PH+PL−2PL PH)2
PH PL (PH−PL)(PH+PL+P 2H−PL PH)
> 0.
Using the above results, the expected profit is given by:
ΠRPM2 =
 qˆ −
PL+PH
PL
ψ +
(PH−PL)(PH+PL+P 2H−PHPL)
2 (PH+PL−2PHPL) ∆ k if
∆ k
ψ < C11,
qˆ otherwise.
(30)
Comparing this profit with that of IPM6 a useful result is that
C5 − C11 = (PH + PL)
2 (1− PH)
PL
(
PH + PL + P 2H − PHPL
) ≥ 0. (31)
This leaves the following cases to be considered:
• ∆ kψ < C11, then ΠRPM2 −ΠIPM6 = (PH−PL)
2(PH+PL)(1−PH)
2 (PH+PL−2PHPL)(2−PH−PL) ∆ k > 0.
• C11 ≤ ∆ kψ < C5, then ΠRPM2 −ΠIPM6 = PL+PHPL ψ −
PH−PL
2−PH−PL ∆ k > 0, since
∆ k
ψ < C5.
• C5 ≤ ∆ kψ , then ΠRPM2 −ΠIPM6 = 0.
It now remains to show that RPM2 strictly dominates IPM6 whenever the latter is the best IPM
contract. First, notice that IPM6 has zero implementation cost and therefore is an optimal contract
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(i.e., cannot be beaten strictly by any other contract) if ∆ kψ ≥ C5. Similarly, RPM2 is an optimal
contract if ∆ kψ ≥ C11. Hence, we can potentially beat all IPM contracts in the range [C11, C5).
Now, recall that
1. IPM5 is not renegotiation proof if ∆ kψ ≥ C4.
2. IPM4 is not renegotiation proof if C2 < ∆ kψ < C1 (implying that PH > 1/2).
Hence, IPM6 is the best renegotiation-proof IPM but not (necessarily) an optimal contract if
max{C2, C4} < ∆ k
ψ
< min{C1, C5}. (32)
We can loosen this condition taking into account that C1 > C2 implies that PH > 12 and then
C4 ≥ C2 (see footnote 28). Therefore, RPM2 is an optimal contract while IPM6, which is the best
IPM contract, does not attain the same profit if
max{C4, C11} < ∆ k
ψ
< min{C1, C5}. (33)
The interval in (33) is non-empty for a non-degenerate range of parameter values. For example,
it can be shown that there exists a non-degenerate range of parameter values for which C1 > C5
(e.g., if PL ∈ [0, PH) and PH ∈ [PL, 0.75)). Moreover,
• C5 > C11 (see equation (31)).
• C5 − C4 = PL (1−PH)+PL (1−PL)(PH−PL) (1−PL) > 0.
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